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DE SE KNOWLEDGE AND
THE POSSIBILITY OF AN OMNISCIENT BEING
Stephan Torre

In this paper I examine an argument that has been made by Patrick Grim for
the claim that de Sf' knowledge is incompatible with the existence of an omniscient being. I claim that the success of the argument depends upon whether
it is possible for someone else to know what I know in knowing (F), where
(F) is a claim involving de se knowledge. I discuss one reply to this argument,
proposed by Edward Wierenga, that appeals to first-person propositions and
argue that this response is unsuccessful. I then consider David Lewis's theory
of de se attitudes involving the self-ascription of properties. I claim that, according to this theory, there are two senses in which someone else can know
what I know in knowing (F). I then argue that the second sense allows for the
compatibility of de Sf knowledge with the existence of an omniscient being.

Consider the following case:! I am at a pool party and around the pool
are several burning torches. At some point, I smell the distinct smell of
burning hair and I come to know that someone's hair is on fire. I then see a
reflection in the water of an individual whose hair is on fire and I come to
know of this individual that his hair is on fire. Next I realize that everyone
is pointing and shouting at me. I suddenly realize:
(F) My hair is on fire!

When I come to realize (F), my behavior changes drastically; I jump into
the pool in order to extinguish the flames. The fact that my behavior
changes drastically when I go from knowing that someone's hair is on fire
(or knowing de re of some person that his hair is on fire) to knowing that
my hair is on fire suggests that a change in knowledge has occurred. What
I know in knowing (F) is not the de dicta knowledge that someone's hair is
on fire or the de re knowledge of some person that his hair is on fire, since
I knew each of these things without jumping into the pool. It isn't even the
de dicta knowledge that Stephan's hair is on fire since I could know that
without jumping into the pool (perhaps if I'd had so much to drink that
I no longer knew that I was Stephan). Examples such as this one suggest
that there is a type of knowledge that is neither de re nor de dicta knowledge. This type of knowledge has been termed de se' knowledge.
I

I. De Se Knowledge and Omniscience

The existence of de se knowledge poses a prima facie difficulty for the possibility of an omniscient being, and more generally, for the possibility that
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some other individual can know what I know when I come to have de
se knowledge. Patrick Grim presents the difficulty that de se knowledge
raises for omniscience as follows:
In order to qualify as omniscient or all-knowing, a being must know
at least all that is known. Such a being must, then, know what I know
in knowing [(F)] .... But what I know in such a case, it appears, is
known by no omniscient being. The indexical 'I' ... is essential to
what 1 know in knowing [(F)]. But only I can use that 'I' to index
me-no being distinct from me can do so. I am not omniscient. But
there is something that I know that no being distinct from me can
know. Neither I nor any being distinct from me, then, is omniscient:
there is no omniscient being. 2
Grim's argument can be restated as follows:
(1) I come to know something, namely (F), when I realize that my hair
is on fire.
(2) No one else can know what I know in knowing (F).
(3) I am not omniscient.
(4) If I know something that no one else can know and 1 am not omniscient then no being is omniscient.
(5) Therefore, no being is omniscient.
Given the validity of Grim's argument, the defender of the possibility of
an omniscient being must reject one of the premises. The 'hair-on-fire' example above and others like it successfully demonstrate that premise (1)
is true: there is something I come to know when I realize that my hair
is on fire. 3 Premise (3) is obvious enough. Premise (4) follows from the
definition of omniscience and logic. The only premise that seems up for
dispute is premise (2).4 In this paper, I will explore whether it is possible
for some individual distinct from myself to know what 1 know in knowing
(F). I will consider two accounts of de se knowledge, one involving firstperson propositions and another involving properties. I will conclude that
a theory of first-person propositions that allows for the falsity of premise
(2) has unacceptable consequences. 1 will claim that on the properties account, there are two senses in which someone else can know what 1 know
in knowing (F): the first sense does not offer much hope for the possibility
of an omniscient being, but the second one does.

II. The First-person Propositions Account
One way of undermining premise (2) is to claim that de se knowledge is
in fact reducible to de dicta knowledge and that this de dicta knowledge is
knowable by beings distinct from me. Such an approach is adopted by Edward Wierenga in The Nature ofGod. 5 Wierenga takes as his starting point
Roderick Chisholm's account of de se knowledge as presented in Person and
Object. 6 Chisholm introduces a special notion of entailment (I will follow
Wierenga in referring to this special sense as 'entailsc') according to which
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a proposition p entails c the property of being Q just in case p is necessarily
such that (i) if it obtains then something has the property of being Q and
(ii) whoever accepts p believes that something is Q. 7 Chisholm claims that
in using a sentence involving a first-person pronoun an individual grasps
a first-person proposition. A first-person proposition is one that entailsc
the individual's individual essence or haecceity. Chisholm provides the
following definition for 'individual essence' or 'haecceity':
G is an individual essence (or haecceity) =Of. G is a property which
is such that, for every x, x has G if and only if x is necessarily such
that it has G, and it is impossible that there is a yother than x such
that y has G.s
On Chisholm's proposal, in believing (F) I believe a first-person proposition that entailsc the conjunction of my individual essence and the property of having hair that is on fire. Chisholm goes on to state the following
"corollary" to his view: "whereas each person knows directly and immediately certain propositions implying his own individual essence, no one
knows any propositions implying the individual essence of anyone else."9
I will refer to this claim in what follows as 'Chisholm's Corollary.'l0
Clearly, Chisholm's account of de se knowledge entails the truth of
premise (2) of Grim's argument. In particular, Chisholm's Corollary states
that no one but me can grasp propositions that entailc my haecceity. If this
is the case, then no one can know what I know in knowing (F) since (F) is
a first-person proposition that entails c my haecceity. Wierenga has argued
that we can accept Chisholm's account of de se knowledge without accepting Chisholm's Corollary. He claims that the thesis that only I can know
my first-person propositions:
... is not an essential requirement of the reduction of de se belief to
de dicta; it is not [as Chisholm claims] a corollary of it. What is crucial to the reduction is that it should provide as an object of my de se
belief something that I cannot believe without believing something
about myself; it is immaterial whether someone else can believe it, as
long as whoever else believes it does not end up with a belief about
himself or herself,u
Wierenga accepts the part of Chisholm's account according to which S's
having a de se belief that he himself or she herself is F involves believing a
first-person proposition p that entailsc the conjunction of S's haecceity and
the property F. However, he rejects the claim that p can only be known by
S. He provides the following formulation of belief de se:
(W) A person, S, believes de se that he himself or she herself is F just
in case there is a haecceity E such that S has E and S believes a proposition entailing c the conjunction of E and F.12
It is consistent with (W) that someone else, S, believes the same first-person

proposition that I believe in believing (F) without S having a de se belief,
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since the haecceity entailed c by the first-person proposition is mine, not
S's. This allows Wierenga to reject premise (2) of Grim's argument since
someone else can know what I know in knowing (F).
It is true that if the proponent of first-person propositions rejects Chisholm's Corollary, he thereby avoids Grim's objection to omniscience.
However, in rejecting the Corollary he also introduces substantial difficulties for his theory. Recall that one of the main reasons for positing
de se belief in the first place was to explain differences in behavior. It
is only when I realize that my hair is on fire that I jump into the pool.
If we reject Chisholm's Corollary, we lose the ability to explain differences in behavior in terms of differences in content.B According to the
view under consideration, when I know (F) I know some first-person
proposition that entails c the conjunction of my haecceity and the property of having hair that is on fire. Suppose that someone else at the party,
Susan, is also able to grasp this first-person proposition. She will grasp
a proposition that entailsc my haecceity and the property of having hair
that is on fire. Knowing this proposition will not lead her to jump in the
pool. The content of her knowledge will be the same as the content of
my knowledge, but her behavior will be different from my behavior. 14
Therefore, rejecting Chisholm's Corollary means rejecting the plausible
supposition that differences in behavior are explainable in terms of differences in content.
Secondly, an example from David Lewis shows that (W) is an unacceptable reduction of de se knowledge to de dicta knowledge. Lewis writes:
Consider the case of two gods. They inhabit a certain possible world,
and they know exactly which world it is. Therefore they know every proposition that is true at their world. Insofar as knowledge is a
propositional attitude, they are omniscient. Still I can imagine them
to suffer ignorance: neither one knows which of the two he is. They
are not exactly alike. One lives on top of the tallest mountain and
throws down manna; the other lives on top of the coldest mountain
and throws down thunderbolts. Neither one knows whether he livE's
on the tallest mountain or on the coldest mountain; nor whether he
throws manna or thunderbolts. 1s
Since both gods know every proposition, they both know every firstperson proposition. Let us refer to the haecceity of the god on the tallest
mountain as 'H.' Call the proposition that entailsc the conjunction of H
and the property of being on the tallest mountain 'p.' Both gods know p.
By (W), the god on the tallest mountain's knowledge of p is de se knowledge, whereas the god on the coldest mountain's knowledge of p is not de
se, since p entailsc the former god's haecceity and not the latter's. But even
though the god on the tallest mountain's knowledge of p amounts to de se
knowledge according to (W), he still doesn't know where he is by knowing only propositions. In order to know where he is, he would have to
know that H is his haecceity. The fact that (W) entails that the god has de se
knowledge, even though he still doesn't know where he is, demonstrates
that the proposed reduction of de se to de dicto fails. 16
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Although rejecting Chisholm's Corollary does allow the proponent
of first-person propositions to reject premise (2) of Grim's argument, it
introduces new difficulties for the theory. First, it requires one to abandon the supposition that differences in behavior are explainable in terms
of differences in content. Secondly, if others are permitted to grasp my
first-person propositions, the additional difficulty arises as to how I can
know that my first-person propositions are mine rather than someone
else'sY Knowing this seems to require knowing what my haecceity is,
and this is knowledge that cannot be given in terms of propositions, firstperson or otherwise.

III. The Properties Account
David Lewis provides an alternative theory of de se knowledge according
to which the objects of de se attitudes are properties. 18 In what follows I
will discuss what implications this theory has for premise (2) of Grim's
argument. I will argue that, given Lewis's theory, there are two different
senses in which someone else can know what I know in knowing (F). Although both senses are sufficient for the rejection of premise (2) of Grim's
argument, the proponent of the possibility of an omniscient God should
claim that God is capable of knowing what I know in knowing (F) in the
second sense.
Lewis takes the objects of de se beliefs to be properties. He claims that
while propositions are sufficient for characterizing the content of the beliefs one might have about what kind of world one inhabits, they fail to
characterize the content of the beliefs one might have about who or where
one is within a world. In order to characterize the content of beliefs concerning who or where one is within a world, we must adopt properties
rather than propositions as the objects of belief. To have a de se belief is
to self-ascribe a property. For example, in believing (F) I self-ascribe the
property of having hair that is on fire (I will refer to this property henceforth as 'F*').
Given this account of knowledge de se, is it true that no one can know
what I know in knowing (F)? Lewis considers a case in which two individuals have the same belief. Madman Heimson believes himself to be Hume.
Hume also believes himself to be Hume. There seems to be a sense in
which Hume and Heimson believe the same thing; however what Heimson believes is false and what Hume believes is true. Lewis states, "There
are two ways out. (1) Heimson does not, after all, believe what Hume did.
Or (2) Heimson does believe what Hume did, but Heimson believes falsely what Hume believed truly."IY In defense of the second way out, Lewis
states, "But there had better also be a central and important sense in which
Heimson and Hume believe alike. For one thing, the predicate 'believes he
is Hume' applies to both."20 Lewis concludes, "If we can agree that beliefs
are in the head, so that Heimson and Hume may indeed believe alike, then
the first way out is shut. We must take the second. Heimson's belief and
Hume's have the same object." n Heimson and Hume both have the same
property as the object of their belief; they both self-ascribe the property of
being Hume.
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The example involving Heimson and Hume suggests a way in which
someone else can know what I know in knowing (F). If the object of someone else's de se knowledge is the same as the object of my de se knowledge
in knowing (F) then she counts as knowing what I know in knowing (F).
This claim can be stated as follows (where 'F*' denotes the property of
having hair that is on fire):
(Ll) Someone else, S, knows what I know in knowing (F) if i) I know
that I myself have F* and ii) S knows that she herself has F*.22
In knowing (F), I self-ascribe the property F*. Suppose there is someone
at the party, Susan, who is out of sight from me and her hair also catches
on fire. Suppose that Susan comes to know (F). In doing so, Susan selfascribes F*. Susan has the same property as the object of her de se knowledge
as I do, and, according to (Ll), she knows what I know in knowing (F).
Is (L1) satisfactory as an account of what it is for someone else to know
what I know in knowing (F)? Does Susan know what I know? I think there
is a sense in which she does and a sense in which she does not. She does
know what I know in that she has the same object of knowledge as I do;
we both have F* as the object of our knowledge. Similarly, sameness of object of knowledge explains sameness of behavior; we both take ourselves
to have the property of having hair that is on fire and we will both try
to extinguish our hair. But there is another sense in which Susan doesn't
know what I know. After all, I know that my hair is on fire and Susan
knows that her hair is on fire. Susan, being out of sight, is completely ignorant of the fact that my hair is on fire. This suggests that although there is a
clear sense in which Susan does know what I know, there is another sense
in which she does not.
Susan's ignorance suggests that there is another sense in which someone distinct from me knows what I know in knowing (F). Lewis considers
the analogous case of belief:
Suppose Heimson manages to convince his psychiatrist that he is
right, so that the psychiatrist also ascribes to Heimson the property
of being Hume. Then Heimson and his psychiatrist share a common
belief. Not in the sense in which Heimson and Burne do-the psychiatrist doesn't believe that he himself is Hume-but in another,
equally legitimate sense. 23
Suppose that Sam is at the party and he sees my hair catch on fire. Just as
there is a sense in which Heimson's psychologist believes what Heimson
believes in believing that he is Hume, there is a sense in which Sam knows
what I know in knowing (F). Sam ascribes to me the same property that
I ascribe to myself. In order for knowledge of this type to be possible, it
must be possible to ascribe properties to other individuals. The ascription
of properties to individuals involves belief de re and on Lewis's account
de re belief is also understood in terms of the self-ascription of properties:
For S to ascribe a property, X, to an individual Y, he i) self-ascribes the
property of standing in a suitable relation of acquaintance, A, uniquely
to something that has the property X and ii) S stands in A to Y.24 Given
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this account of what it is to ascribe properties to an individual, we can
formulate a second sense in which someone can know what 1 know in
knowing (F):
(L2) Someone else,S, knows what I know in knowing (F) if i) 1 know
that I myself have F* and ii) 5 knows that he himself has the property of standing in a suitable relation of acquaintance, A, uniquely to
something that has F* and iii) 5 stands in A to me.
Sam knows what I know in knowing (F) in the sense given by (L2) since
he knows that he has the property of standing in a suitable relation of acquaintance to something (and nothing else) that has F* and Sam does, in
fact, stand in that relation to me.
Note that according to the sense of 'knowing what 1 know' given in
(L2), having the same knowledge as me does not require having the same
object of de se knowledge as me. The object of my de se knowledge is F*;
whereas the object of Sam's de se knowledge is the property of bearing a relation of acquaintance uniquely to an individual that has F*. This time the
difference in our respective objects of knowledge explains the differences
in our behavior (I jump in the pool, Sam runs over to help).
1 have claimed that, given Lewis's theory, there are two distinct senses
in which someone else can be said to know what I know in knowing (F).
It might be objected that (U) and (L2) both fail to give a proper account
of what it is for someone else to know what I know in knowing (F). After
all, as argued above, Susan can have the same object of knowledge as me
without knowing that my hair is on fire. So there seems to be a sense in
which Susan does not know what 1 know in knowing (F). Similarly, Sam
can ascribe the same property to me that I ascribe to myself, but in doing
so, the object of his knowledge is not the same as the object of my knowledge. So there is a sense in which Sam does not know what I know in
knowing (F) since the object of our knowledge differs. One might argue
that to truly count as knowing what I know in knowing (F), someone else
must (i) have the same property as me as the object of one's knowledge
and (ii) must ascribe that property to me.
However, it is a consequence of the properties account that it is logically impossible for someone distinct from me to satisfy both (i) and (ii).
This can be seen by noting that on this theory, de se knowledge is a special
case of de re knowledge; de se knowledge involves the ascription of a property to an object (viz. oneself). Lewis states, "Self-ascription of properties
is ascription of properties to oneself under the relation of identity. Certainly, identity is a relation of acquaintance par excellence. So belief de se
falls under belief de re."2S When 1 know (F), I ascribe F* to myself under the
relation of identity. No one else can do that for the mundane reason that
no one else is identical to me. Someone distinct from me can either ascribe
F* to me under some non-identity acquaintance relation, by having some
property other than F* as the object of his knowledge (such as in the case
of Sam), or one can have F* as the object of her knowledge without ascribing F* to me (such as in the case of Susan). What is impossible, on the
properties account, is for anyone distinct from me to have F* as the object
of her knowledge while, at the same time, ascribing it to me.
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TV. The Properties Account and the Possibility of Omniscience

Let us now return to Grim's argument against omniscience. I have claimed
that on Lewis's theory there are two senses in which someone else can
know what I know in knowing (F), so adopting Lewis's theory allows one
to reject premise (2). Grim recognizes that Lewis's theory allows for someone else to know what I know in knowing (F), however he claims that
although the theory "might seem to offer an escape for omniscience from
indexical difficulties," it, in fact, leaves omniscience "in worse shape than
before."26 He claims, "In order for God to know what I know, on Lewis's account, he must self-attribute truly the properties of making a mess
and of having made some terrible mistakes. But God cannot self-attribute
such properties truly; for God makes neither messes nor mistakes. Cod
does not, then, know what I know. God is not omniscient."27 The sense
of 'knowing what I know' that Grim adopts in this passage is clearly the
sense given by (11). Grim presupposes that in order for God to know what
I know in knowing (F), God, like Susan, must truly self-ascribe F*. Truly
self-ascribing various properties like having hair that is on fire, or making
a mess, Grim argues, would run contrary to God's nature. 28 However, the
proponent of the possibility of an omniscient being should not claim that
Cod knows what I know in knowing (F) in the sense given by (11). After
all, recall that Susan can know what I know in the sense of (11) while being completely ignorant of the fact that my hair is on fire. Similarly, God
might know everything that I know in the sense of (11) without knowing
any of the properties that I have. I agree with Grim that if the proponent
of the possibility of omniscience claims that Cod knows what I know in
the sense given by (L1) then omniscience is in worse shape than before.
However, I think the proponent of the possibility of omniscience would
be foolish to claim that God knows what I know in knowing (F) in the
sense of (11). Instead she should claim that God knows what I know in
knowing (F) in the sense given by (L2): God knows what I know in virtue
of being able to truly ascribe to me all those properties that I know myself
to have.
It might be objected that even though God knows what I know in
knowing (F) in the sense given by (L2), there is still a sense in which God
does not know what I know in knowing (F), since God does not have the
same object of de se knowledge as me. God fails to know what I know in
the (11) sense. An objector might argue that God's lack of knowledge in
this sense is sufficient for denying his omniscience. However, as noted
above, given the properties account, it is logically impossible for a being
distinct from me to know what I know in both the (11) and the (L2) sense.
Therefore, knowing what I know in both of these senses cannot be a requirement for omniscience. Since the (L2) sense is the sense of 'knowing
what I know' that is relevant to omniscience, only this sense is necessary
for omniscience. The defender of Grim's argument had better not demand
that God truly ascribes F* to me under the same relation that I ascribe F*
to myself, because I ascribe F* to myself under the relation of identity, and
not even God is capable of doing thaU 9
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NOTES
1. The example I present is a variation on David Kaplan's 'pants-on-fire'
example in David Kaplan, "Demonstratives," in Themes From Kaplan, ed. Almog, Perry, and Wettstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 481-563.
Other examples involving de se beliefs may be found in John Perry, "The
Problem of the Essential IndexicaL" Noz1s 13 (1979): 3-21 and in Hector-Neri
Castaneda, "'He': A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness," Ratio 8 (1966):
130-57.
2. In Patrick Grim, "Against Omniscience: The Case from Essential Indexicals," Noz1s 19 (1985): 151-80. Grim uses Perry's 'messy shopper' example
to motivate his argument. In the original quote he refers not to (F) but to the
claim: I am making a mess. A similar argument is given by Norman Kretzmann
in "Omniscience and Immutability," Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966): 409-21.
3. I am assuming here that when I go from knowing de re of Stephan that
his hair is on fire to knowing de se that my hair is on fire, there is something
new that I come to know; the content of my knowledge changes. This overlooks the account presented by Perry in "The Problem of the Essential Indexical." Perry holds that when I go from having de re knowledge to having de se
knowledge, there is no change in content. He claims that what I know in both
cases is a singular proposition consisting of me and the property of having
hair that is on fire. According to Perry, what changes in going from the de re
case to the de se case is the way in which I believe this singular proposition. I
find this account unpersuasive. It seems clear that in the hair-on-fire example,
and others like it, when I go from having de re knowledge to having de se
knowledge, there is something that I come to learn; there is a change in what
I know, not just in how I know something. This change in what I know seems
best characterized in terms of a change in the content of my knowledge.
4. Some disagree. It has been suggested to me by Phil Bricker and by an
anonymous referee that the defender of the possibility of an omniscient being
should deny premise (4) of Grim's argument. This would mean denying that
an omniscient being must know all that is known. On such an account it is
possible that I know something that is not known by an omniscient being. Although rejecting premise (4) does avoid Grim's conclusion, it means adopting
a substantially weakened account of omniscience. An account of omniscience
that succeeds in rejecting premise (2) and upholds (4) is, I think, preferable to
one that rejects (4) and thereby admits that an omniscient being fails to know
all that is known.
5. Edward Wierenga, The Nature of God (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1989).
6. Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object (Lasalle, IL: Open Court, 1976).
Chisholm rejects this account of de se belief later in The First Person (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981). In this later work, Chisholm adopts
a property account of de se belief similar to the one I consider below.
7. Chisholm, 28.
8. Ibid., 29. I follow Chisholm in using 'individual essence' and 'haecceity'interchangeably. I realize this overlooks some important issues.
9. Ibid., 36.
10. As Wierenga I think correctly points out, 'corollary' turns out to be a
misnomer.
11. Wierenga, 51.
12. Ibid.
13. Jonathan Kvanvig also raises this point in discussing Chisholm's theory in The Possibility of an All-Knowing God (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986),
65.
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14. One might object that even though Susan and I both have the same
first-person proposition as the content of our knowledge, there are differences
in our other beJiefs that account for our differences in behavior. In response
we can suppose that Susan and I are alike with respect to our entire system of
beliefs. It will still be the case that we will behave differently.
15. David Lewis, "Attitudes De Dicta and De Se," Philosophical Papers, Vol. I
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) 139.
16. Wierenga (54-56) considers Lewis's example. When Lewis discusses
the example of the gods as an objection to a haecceitist account of de sc, he
claims that the god on the tallest mountain knows the proposition expressed
by his utterance 'I am on the tallest mountain' without knowing that he himself is on the tallest mountain. Wierenga takes Lewis to be making the point
that the god doesn't know the utterance is his utterance. Wierenga points out,
correctly I think, that this knowledge not necessary for knowledge de se. I take
Lewis to be making a different point. The god doesn't know that the proposition expressed by the utterance is his proposition (that it entails c his essence)
even though, according to (W), his knowledge of the proposition counts as de
sc knowledge.
17. Note that both of these difficulties never arise if the proponent of firstperson propositions keeps Chisholm's Corollary. However, the trouble with
Chisholm's Corollary is that it lacks independent motivation: why can't someone distinct from me know the same first-person propositions as me? Perhaps
it is exactly this lack of independent motivation that leads Wierenga to jettison
it.
18. Lewis (1986). A similar account is presented in Chisholm (1981).
19. Lewis, 142.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., 143.
22. As noted above, Lewis takes de se belief to involve the self-ascription of
a property. For me to believe that my hair is on fire is to self-ascribe the property of having hair that is on fire. For me to know that my hair is on fire, it cannot be the case that I merely self-ascribe F* since self-ascription is not sufficient
for knowledge. I take the locution'S knows that she herself has property P' to
express the knowledge analogue of'S self-ascribes property P' for the belief
case.
23. Lewis, 151.
24. See Lewis, 155-57 for what counts as a suitable relation of acquaintance. In my example I assume that seeing counts as such a relation.
25. Lewis, 156.
26. Grim, 171.
27. Ibid.
28. Grim also points out that the difficulty does not just lie in the fact that
God would need to truly self-ascribe properties that are contrary to his nature.
If knowing what I know in the sense of (LI) were required for omniscience,
God would also have to truly ascribe contradictory properties to himself. See
Grim, 172.
29. I would like to thank Lynne Rudder Baker, Phillip Bricker, Chris Heathwood, Joshua Spencer, Brandt Van der Gaast, the audience at the 3rd Biennial
Graduate Epistemology Conference at the University of Rochester, and two
anonymous referees for helpful comments on this paper.

